Abstract:
This research addresses a modern legal problem related to the attribution of criminal liability for killings by drones that carry out crimes remotely. It discusses the philosophical challenge posed by the absence of a direct relationship between the perpetrator and the criminal act, which necessitates a reconsideration of the concept of intent and individual responsibility, as well as a discussion of the technical dimensions that create multiple actors (the programmer, the operator, the commander). It questions the classical rules of the perpetrator and the accomplice. It compares legal systems (Iraqi, French, and American) in their treatment of technical acts and the elements of the crime, highlighting legislative disparities. This demonstrates that traditional law is in need of philosophical and methodological modernization to address the development of automated cybercrimes. It focuses on the need to redefine the moral element to include the intent of technical control, not just manual action. It raises a philosophical question about the limits of criminal acts: Who actually kills? The machine, or the human who commands it? It highlights the absence of explicit legislative texts regulating crimes committed through modern technological means. It calls for the development of an expanded theory of liability based on the expected consequences of technological action. It concludes by emphasizing the need to adapt criminal jurisprudence to the reality of contemporary crime to ensure effective justice