The overlap in trade relations and the differential dependence of countries on each other either for the acquisition of natural resources or the need for access to large markets for the disposal of their goods, may have led to the emergence of a pattern of economic dependency that is tempting to use it for political purposes as a trade policy. Some countries find themselves obliged to follow political pressures for the weakness or lack of alternatives, while others face the problem of finding cheap and viable alternatives in order to get rid of the pressures of these demands. Economic dependency does not succeed in turning into a political weapon in all circumstances, because the need for security and fear of threats can make submission to the demands of the security provider superior to submission to the demands of the commodity provider, since security itself has become a commodity.
The inductive analysis approach and moving from part to whole were used. In light of the requirements of this approach, we studied the case of energy relations between Russia and Europe and how Russia tried or initially believed that it could use economic dependence as a political weapon. Studying this case provided a deeper perspective on the conditions of success and failure of this policy, which can be generalized to other cases similar in their conditions and variables.